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COMMENTARY

Our Men in Guadalajara and the Abduction of
Suspects Abroad: A Comment on United
States v. Alvarez-Machain
John Quigle*
We have people who deliver people to us ....
might just find a fellow somewhere, all tied up.'

I.

You

INTRODUCTION

Last year when the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Alvarez-Machain ruled on the legality of abducting a suspect abroad, a significant element was missing in its analysis. The
Court analyzed the rights of the United States, as well as the
rights of the state' where the abduction occurred, which in that
case was Mexico. However, neither the majority opinion nor the
strong dissent addressed the issue of whether United States Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA"J agents violated Dr. Alvarez-Machain's
personal rights when they abducted him and shipped him involuntarily across an international border.
The Court's omission is even more glaring in light of the
United States' ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights in 1992.' By ignoring the human rights issue
Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B. 1966, Harvard; MA. 1966, Harvard.
1 John Walcott & Andy Pasztor, Reagan Ruling to Let CIA Kidnap Terrorsts Oveseas Is
Disdosed WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1987, at 1 (United States official describing techniques of
kidnapping suspects abroad).
2 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
3 "State" is used in this Article, unless otherwise indicated, to mean nation-state.
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. ExE. Doc. E, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter International Covenant] (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). The United States ratified the International
Covenant in 1992. See, e.g., White House Statement on Signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1008 (June 5, 1992)
[hereinafter White House Statement] (During the signing ceremony, former President
Bush stated, in part, "I . .-. ratify and confirm the said Covenant, subject to the said
reservations, understandings and declarations.") (typescript copy of former President
*
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in Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court put the United States
squarely in violation of its obligation to observe minimum
standards for individual rights, regardless of nationality or location.
Obvious human rights violations should have barred the Court's
conclusion that the abduction of an individual, in a country with
whom the United States has an extradition treaty, does not bar
jurisdiction of United States courts.' The Court overlooked these
violations, especially at a time when human rights considerations
should be at the forefront of judicial thinking.
II.

THE ALVAREZ-AACHAIN OPINION

In 1990, DEA agents hired several Mexican nationals to abduct Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national residing
in that country, and deliver him to the United States. 6 The DEA
claimed to have information that Dr. Alvarez-Machain was involved
in the abduction-torture-murder of Enrique Camarena, a DEA special agent, that occurred in Mexico in 1985.' The DEA alleged
that Dr. Alvarez-Machain gave Camarena injections to keep him
alive while his abductors tortured and interrogated him.' The
men hired by the DEA seized Dr. Alvarez-Machan from his office
in Guadalajara, forced him onto a private airplane, and flew him
to El Paso, Texas, where DEA officials awaited him.9 DEA officials
arrested Dr. Alvarez-Machain, and then a federal grand jury indicted him." Mexico protested the seizure and demanded both the
return of Dr. Alvarez-Machan and the extradition of two persons
it suspected as the DEA's hired abductors."

Bush's statement on file with author); see also Jordan Paust, Avoiding 'Fraudulent" Executive
Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL
L. REV. (forthcoming 1993); John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Supremacy Claus 42 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 1993).
5 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190.
6 United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602-04 (C.D. Cal. 1990), af/'d
sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. CL

2188 (1992).
7 Id. at 601.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 603.
10 Dr. Alvarez-Machain was charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1959 (1988) (conspiracy
to commit violence in furtherance of racketeering activity); § 1959(a)(2) (violence in
furtherance of racketeering activity); 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5), (c) (1988) (conspiracy to
kidnap federal agent); § 1201(a)(5) (kidnap of federal agent); and 18 U.S.C. §§ 11l1(a),
1114 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (felony murder of federal agent). Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.
CL at 2190 n.1.
11 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. CL at 2196 n.16; id. at 2197 nn.1-2 (Stevens, J., dis-
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Dr. Alvarez-Machain objected to being tried in the United
States because of the irregularity of his rendition, arguing that the
abduction violated an extradition treaty between Mexico and the
United States. 2 The United States district court decided that the
abduction did violate the treaty and that the violation vitiated its
jurisdiction to try Dr. Alvarez-Machain. 14The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed on similar reasoning.
The United States Supreme Court, by a six to three vote,
reversed, deciding that the abduction did not violate the extradition treaty.s The Court framed the issue as relating only to the
extradition treaty and discussed only that issue in its opinion.
The issue in this case is whether a criminal defendant, abducted to the United States from a nation with which it has an
extradition treaty, thereby acquires a defense to the jurisdiction
of this country's courts. We hold that he does not, and that he
may be tried in federal district6 court for violations of the criminal law of the United States.'
On remand, a trial was held in the district court. At the close of
the prosecution's case, the judge dismissed the charges for lack of
evidence.' 7 Dr. Alvarez-Machain was- released and returned to
Mexico.

senting).
12 Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.
13 Citm-Qinl-r, 745 F. Supp. at 614.
14 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rv'4, 112 S. Ct.
2188 (1992). The Ninth Circuit based its decision on a prior- case, United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992), because Verdug&-Urquid had a factual basis similar to Alvarez-Mac/win. In Verdugo-Urquidez
Verdugo-Urquidez was detained by six Mexican police officers. Id.at 1216. At the instigation of DEA agents, the Mexican officers drove Verdugo-Urquidez to the United StatesMexican border and turned him over to United States Marshals. Id. The Mexican police
officers were indicted for kidnapping. Id. at 1216 n.1. Verdugo-Urquidez raised the abduction as a bar to jurisdiction, but the district court overruled his motion. Id. at 1215.
Verdugo-Urquidez did not appeal that ruling.
15 Alvarez-Machai, 112 S. Ct. at 2197.
16 Id. at 2190.
17 Jim Newton, Judge Orders Camarena Case Defendant Freed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992,
at Al (reporting that proof was insufficient to show that Dr. Alvarez-Machain had given
injections to Camarena).
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ABDUCTION AND SOVEREIGNTY RIGHTS

Alvarez-Machain was the first twentieth-century -case in which

the United States Supreme Court considered whether a suspect
may be tried after being abducted abroad." The practical importance of the decision is that the United States and other states
have used abduction abroad more frequently in recent decades.
For example, to capture a mail and securities fraud suspect in
Bimini, Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") personnel duped the
man into entering an airplane, held him at gunpoint, and forced
him to fly to the United States where he was arrested by Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents. 9 In addition, along with
Dr. Alvarez-Machain, another Mexican suspected in the same
20
crime was abducted to the United States.
Other states also have abducted suspects in cases they con-

sidered particularly important. Uruguay abducted political dissidents who had taken refuge in neighboring states.21 Israel abducted Nazi official Adolf Eichmann in Argentina on World War II
charges of crimes against humanity.' It also abducted a man in
Italy and tried him for treason and espionage. 3

18 In the nineteenth century, however, the Supreme Court addressed this issue. See,
e.g., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
19 United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981).
20 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S.
259 (1990). For a discussion of the facts of Verdugo-Urquide, see supra note 14.
21 On July 13, 1976, a Uruguayan man, who was a trade unionist, allegedly was
abducted from Argentina by Uruguayan security and intelligence forces, who were aided
by Argentinean paramilitary groups. Report of the Human Rights Committee: Case of Sergio
Rubin Lhpez Burgos, Communication No. R.12/5, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
176, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) [hereinafter L4p= Burgos]. L6pez Burgos was abducted
on a charge of "subversive association" and allegedly was tortured and ill-treated during
his detention. Id.
In another abduction case, Uruguayan agents abducted Lilian Celiberti de Casagiero,
a Uruguayan woman, on November 12, 1978 from Brazil on a charge of "subversive association." Report of the Human Rights Committee: Case of Lilian Cedlberti de Casariego, Communication No. R.13/56, supra at 185 [hereinafter Celibertil.
22 Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 5 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961)
(summary, A. Munkman), afd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Sup. CL Isr. 1962).
23 See Israel v. Mordechai Vanunu, reported in Around the Worl Israel Nuclear Technician Charged with Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1986, at A7; Israel Opens Trial in Espionage
Cas4 N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 1987, at A8; Ex-Technician Appears in Court in Jerusalem, ST.
Louis PoST-DISPATCH, Dec. 1, 1986, at 8A; Vanunu: Isreal Wll Explain to Rome JERUSALEM
Posr (int'l ed.), Jan. 3, 1987, at 4 (stating that charges related to information given to a
newspaper by the abductee, a former technician at an Israeli nuclear power facility, that
Israel had prepared one hundred nuclear bombs at the facility). After unsuccessfully
pleading the abduction as a bar to prosecution, Vanunu was convicted and sentenced to
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Efforts to combat terrorism and drug trafficking have led to
renewed interest in abduction by the United States. United States
military aircraft forced down an Egyptian aircraft that was flying in
international waters over the Mediterranean Sea because the airliner contained suspected terrorists.2 4 Former President Ronald. Reagan also reportedly issued a directive authorizing the abduction
abroad of suspected terrorists.'S United States authorities have
used abduction to combat drug trafficking. In the company of and
at the apparent instigation of four United States Marshals, Honduran army officers detained a Honduran man in Honduras who was

prison. Supreme Court Won't Review Vanunu Case, JERUSALEM PoST, Feb. 12, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JPOST File (stating that Supreme Court of Israel denied
Vanunu's second appeal). Israel abducted 11 people in Lebanon and tried them for
membership in an organization hostile to Israel. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures
and IrregularRendition Devices as Alternatives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25, 30
(1973). Israeli planes, searching for suspected terrorists, forced down a Libyan civil aircraft that was flying over the Mediterranean Sea. See Gregory V. Gooding, Fighting Terrorism in the 1980's: The Interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers, 12 YALE J. INT'L L 158,
175-76 (1987); Thomas L Friedman, Israelis Intercept a Libyan Civil Jet and Then Let It Go,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1986, at Al.
24 On October 10, 1985, United States authorities intercepted the persons accused of
hijacking the cruise ship Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean Sea, forcing their aircraft to
land, at a NATO base in Sicily. See Gooding, supra note 23. In addition, the U.S. State
Department, commenting on Israel's interception of an aircraft it thought was carrying
suspected terrorists, said that interceptions are justified in 'very narrow counterterrorism
cases" when there is "the strongest and clearest evidence that terrorists are on board."
U.S. Declines Judgment on Plane Interception, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1986, at Ag. Vernon
Waiters, United States delegate to the United Nations Security Council, vetoed a draft
resolution that would have condemned Israel's interception, arguing that interceptions in
search of suspected terrorists are justified under some circumstances. U.S Vetoes Anti-Israel
Move, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1986, at A6.
25 Walcott & Pasztor, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting administration sources that such a
directive was adopted in January 1986 and that the CIA was to undertake such operations); see Stephen Engelberg, U.& is Said to Weigh Abducting Terroristsfor Trials Here; N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 1986, at Al (CIA preparing contingency plans for abduction of several
persons in Middle East implicated by United States in terrorist 'acts); see also Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appnopyiations for Fiscal Year 1987: Hearings Before a Senate
Subcomm. on Appropriations on H.R. 5339/ 2824, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1987), reported
in Bernard Gwermnan, Shultz Backs 'Moderate Force' Against Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
1986, at A8 (Former Secretary of State George Shultz answered affirmatively when asked
by Senator Arlen Specter, 'Would you sanction use of moderate force to take terrorists
into custody in remote parts of the world to bring them to the United States to stand
trial?"); David L Abney, 'Abducting Terorists to Try in U.S.: A Sanctioned Way to Fight the
Foe?, NAT'L UJ., June 30, 1986, at 41 (Judge advocate general officer stating, "It is time
to institute a full-scale program to abduct known international terrorists by bounty or
direct government action, and then bring them to trial in our federal courts.").
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wanted on drug charges in the United States. 26 The man2 7 was
forced onto an airplane and then flown to the United States.
One reason for abduction is the absence of an extradition
treaty with the country where the suspect is located. 28 Even where
an extradition treaty is in force, the treaty may not cover the offense in question, particularly if the offense can be characterized
as political.' In Alvarez-Machain, the apparent reason for the abduction was that the United States-Mexico extradition treaty did
not require, and Mexican law prohibited, the extradition of nationals.s'
The desire of states to gain custody of a suspect is understandable. However, custody through abduction is problematic in
two regards. First, the rights of the state where the abduction
occurs are implicated. States do not like foreign agents operating
in their territory to carry out what constitutes the crime of kidnapping. Each state enjoys sovereignty over its territory, and it is a
violation of that sovereignty for other states to carry out criminal
investigative functions without consent."'

26 Matta-Ballesteros ex t. Stolar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1040, 1041-42 (S.D. Ill.
1988), affid, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990).
27 Id. Matta-Ballesteros raised the abduction as a bar to his prosecution because it
allegedly violated extradition treaties, which the United States and Honduras are signatories. Id. at 1043. The court did not entertain his motion because Honduras had not
protested any violation of the extradition treaty. Id. As a result, Matta-Ballestros was precluded "from personally asserting that a violation of any extradition treaty has occurred."
Id. at 1043-44.
28 Manuel Garcia-Mora, C7iminal Jurisdiction of a State over Fugitives Brought from a Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L.J. 427, 427-49,(1957); Kandy
G. Webb, Note, Constitutional and InternationalLaw-International Kidnaping-Government legality as a Challenge to Jurisdiction, 50 TUL. L. REV. 169, 170 (1975).
29 Webb, supra note 28, at 177.
30 Extradition Treaty, supra note 12, art. 9, at 5065 (requiring a state that refuses to
extradite on grounds that the person sought is a national to take criminal proceedings
against that person itself).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276-78 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding
violation of United Nations Charter); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNTED STATES § 432 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMEmT] ("A state's law enforcement
officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that state."); see also FA.
Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW- AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 407 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds.,
1989) ("A State which authorizes the abduction of a person from the territory of another
sovereign State is guilty of a violation of public international law. This principle is supported by considerable State practice, numerous decisions of municipal courts and a large
body of doctrinal opinion."); id. at 408 (saying that a state that tries the abductee commits an international wrong against the state where the abduction occurred even if the
abductors were not acting at the behest of the state that conducts the trial because the
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In Alvarez-Machain, the United States Supreme Court did not
address this question, limiting itself rather to the issue of whether
the abduction violated Mexico's rights under the United StatesMexico extradition treaty. 2 However, even absent an extradition
treaty, the rights of a state where such an abduction occurs are
violated. The United Nations Security Council twice has issued
condemnations over abductions. Argentina protested to Israel over
the abduction of Eichmann in Argentina and then complained to
the Security Council, asking for Eichmann's return and for the
punishment of the abductors."3 The Council said that Israel had
violated Argentina's sovereignty, and it "request[ed] the Government of Israel to make appropriate reparation."'
Israel and Argentina then issued a joint communiqu6 reciting that the abduction had "infringed fundamental rights of the State of Argenti35

na."

Lebanon also has complained to the Security Council about
abductions. Israeli airplanes, while searching for a suspected terrorist, intercepted a Lebanese civil aircraft over Lebanon and
forced the Lebanese plane to land in Israel.' The Security Council adopted a resolution condemning Israel's action, calling it a
violation of the United Nations Charter, of civil aviation treaties,
and of "the principles of international law and morality."3 7 The
Council did not have to address the question of returning any
abductees because Israel released all passengers when it discovered
that the suspected terrorist was not on board.'M

state ratifies the abduction simply by putting the abductee on trial); IVAN SHEARER, EX(noting that no international tribunal has
had occasion to rule on the issue).
32 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2190 (1992).
33 Letter Dated 15 June 1960 flra the Repretative of Argentina to the President of the
Security Counci U.N. SCOR, 15th year, Supp. Apr.-June 1960, at 27-28, U.N. Doc. S/4336
(1960).
34 Resolution Adopted by the Security Council Concerning the Case of Adolf Eichmann, S.C.
Res. 138, U.N. SCOR, 15th year, 868th mtg., Supp. Apr.-June 1960, at 35, U.N. Doc.
S/4349 (1960).
35 Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36 I.LR. 5, 59 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961), af'd, 36
I.LR. 277 (Sup. Ct. Isr. 1962). The communiqu6 further stated that the two states regarded the incident as "closed." ad Eichmann was tried in Israel, convicted, and executed. Id.at 273-76 (conviction); Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 341-42 (Sup.
Ct. Isr. 1962) (affirming death sentence).
36 Gooding, supra note 23, at 163; Terence Smith, Israelijets Over Lebanon Force Down
Arab Airliner, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1973, at Al.
37 S.C. Res. 337, U.N. SCOR, 28th year, 1740th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/28, reprinted in 9 REsOiS. & DECISIONs 44 (1973).
38 Smith, supra note 36, at Al. States objected that the resolution merely con-

TRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72-73 (1971)
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The state where the abduction occurs has a right to the
abductee's return and indemnification for the abduction.39 For
example, when Germany abducted a man from Switzerland and
charged him with treason, Switzerland filed a diplomatic protest
and initiated arbitration proceedings against Germany to gain the
return of the man.' Before the case was heard, Germany returned the man.41
The traditional position of the United States and other states
generally is that abduction of suspects abroad violates the sovereign rights of that territorial state.42 However, United States officials in the 1980s gave mixed opinions on the matter when commenting on proposals to abduct persons suspected of terrorism.
For example, former Attorney General Edwin Meese thought such
abduction was justified as self-defense against prior or anticipated
terrorist attacks.43 Former Secretary of State George Shultz said,
"A nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force .
" 44
seize terrorists . . . when no other means is available.

.

. to

A Justice Department memorandum, whose contents were
widely reported but which was not made public, asserted that the
President was free to disregard international law if he felt it necessary to order the abduction abroad of terrorists. 4 State Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer, however, said that such abductions were unlawful under international law.' Sofaer further

demned Israel's action and did not impose sanctions. See U.N. SCOR, 28th year, 1740th
mtg. at 2-4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1740 (1973) (Sudan, U.S.S.R., India, and Yugoslavia). In a
similar incident, Israel forced down a Syria-bound Libyan civil aircraft in flight. U.S. Declines Judgment on Plane Interception, supra note 24, at A8. A draft resolution condemning
the action as "aerial hijacking and piracy" was not adopted by the Security Council as
result of a United States veto. U.S. Vetoes Anti-Israel Move, supra note 24, at A6. The persons sought were not on board, and Israel released all passengers.
39 See, e.g., Mann, supra note 31, at 411 (obligation to return the abductee); Research in International Law Under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law
School, Jurisdiction with Respect to Cime (Part I), 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 623, 623-24 (Supp.
1935) (Comment to article 16).
40 Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 60-61; Lawrence Preuss, Settlement of the Jacob Kidnapping Case (Swiftedand-Germany), 30 AM J. INT'L L. 123, 123-24 (1936).
41 See sources cited supra note 40.
42 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 432.
43 Walcott & Pasztor, supra note 1, at 1.
44 Bernard Gwertzman, Shultz Supports Armed Reprisals: On Terror, He Says, U.S. Can't
Wait for Absolute Clarity,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1986, at A8.
45 Michael Isikoff & Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Militasy Given Foreign Arrest Powers, WASH.
POST, Dec. 16, 1989, at Al.
46 FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad. Hearing Before the Subcomr. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judicary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1989) (statement of Abraham Sofaer). However, in the same statement, Sofaer also recognized that
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noted that states are entitled to the use of their territory, and that
47
abductions violate their sovereignty.
IV. JURISDICTION TO TRY AN ABDUCTEE
Despite the fact that abductions violate the sovereignty of the
state where they occur, United States courts generally have held
that an abduction does not bar prosecution once the suspect is
before them. 48 In Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court affirmed
the propriety of trying a suspect who was abducted abroad.4 9 The
Court only addressed the narrow issue of whether the abduction
violated the United States-Mexico extradition treaty.'
Finding
that it did not, 1 the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling
without addressing the broader issue of whether Mexican sovereignty was violated, and whether that might vitiate jurisdiction.
Because abduction violates sovereignty, the practice of finding
jurisdiction has been criticized on the ground that it involves taking advantage of an illegal act. 2
In Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court relied on a nineteenth3
century precedent, Ker v. Illinois,"
that involved an abduction in
Peru. In that case, Peru had agreed to a United States request to

"[d]espite the importance of the principle of territorial integrity there are situations in
which that principle is not entitled, under international law, to absolute deference." Id. at
24.
47 Id. at 31; see also Bill to Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who Attack U.S.
Gov't Employees and Citizens Abroad. Hearing Before the Subcom. on Security and Terrorism of
the Senate Comm. on the Judidary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1985) (Abraham Sofaer stating
that abductions violate sovereignty). But see Bills to Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and
Others Who Attack U.& Gov't Employees and Citizens Abroad: Hearing on S.1373, S. 1429, and
S. 1508, before the Senate Comm on the Judiciar, Subcomm on Security and Terrorism, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1986) (statement of Abraham Sofaer). Sofaer stated that abductions
are unlawful but suggesting they may nonetheless be necessary and appropriate:
In general, seizure by U.S. officials of terrorist suspects abroad might constitute
a serious breach of the territorial sovereignty of the foreign State, could violate
local kidnapping laws, and might well be viewed by the foreign State as a violation of international law and as incompatible with any bilateral extradition treaty
in force. Yet, self help is sometimes necessary in various areas of public and
private law, and this area is no exception.
Id.
48 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
49 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 (1992).
50 Id. at 2188.
51 Id. at 2196-97.
52 Garcia-Mora, supra note 28, at 447 (citing the maxim ex injuriae jus non oritur in
this connection); Mann, supra note 31, at 414-15.
53 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
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extradite the suspect, but there was political disorder in Peru
when the United States official arrived.' Therefore, instead of
going through the Peruvian government, he abducted the suspect. 5 The United States Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction, saying that "forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party
should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the
court which has the right to try him"' because
the abduction
57
violated no law or treaty of the United States.
Courts in the United States generally have followed the Ker
approach.' The only major deviation was a decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Toscanino,"9 a case
involving an abduction from Uruguay. The Second Circuit said
that the abduction violated the United Nations Charter and the
Charter of the Organization of American States, which mandate
respect for territorial integrity.' It found that a United States
court has no jurisdiction to prosecute an abductee, so long as the
state where the abduction occurred deemed its sovereignty infringed. 6 The court said that "the government should be denied
the right to exploit its own illegal conduct, . . and when an
accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought within the jurisdiction,
the court's acquisition of power over his person represents the
62
fruits of the government's exploitation of its own misconduct."
It further stated that "the government should as a matter of fundamental fairness be obligated to return [the accused] to his status
quo ante." 63
In a later case in which the state where the abduction occurred did not protest, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the prosecution on the basis that no violation of territorial
integrity occurs absent a protest from that state.'
54

Id. at 438.

55

Id.

56 Id. at 444.
57 Id. at 442 (The Court apparently viewed the abduction as not violating the United States-Peru extradition treaty because of the chaotic situation in Peru.).
58 See, e.g., United States ex reL Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974).

59

500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).

60 Id. at 277; see, eg., U.N. CHARTER art. 2; Charter of the Organization of American
States, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 17, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2420, 119 U.N.T.S. 48, 56, amended by the

Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 721 U.N.T.S. 324 (Protocol, in
part, changing original article 17 to article 20).
61
62

Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 276-78.
Id. at 275.

63
64

Id.
United States ex Yet Lujan v. Genger, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.), cerL. denied, 421
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Like the United States Supreme Court, courts elsewhere allow
a trial to proceed following an abduction.' In Britain, for example, the King's Bench allowed criminal proceedings to be brought
against the accused, even though a British police officer had apprehended the accused in Belgium without the consent of Belgian
authorities and forcibly brought the accused to England. 6 The
court stated that the fact that the abduction might have violated
Belgian law was irrelevant to the issue of jurisdiction.P
The Swiss Federal Tribunal, however, has ruled that abduction
abroad is a bar to jurisdiction. In one case, German authorities
sought a Belgian national who was temporarily in Italy.' After
duping the man into travelling from Italy to Switzerland, German
authorities arrested' him.' Germany then requested extradition
from Switzerland, with which it had an extradition treaty. 7 Had
Germany tried to extradite the man from Belgium, a 'GermanBelgian extradition treaty7' would have given Germany no right
to extradition because it did not compel extradition of nation-

U.S. 1001 (1975). Lujan, a pilot, was lured into flying an American agent to Bolivia from
Argentina. Id.at 63. Upon Lujan's arrival in Bolivia, Bolivian police, acting as paid agents
of the United States, took Lujan into custody and subsequently took him to New York
where federal agents formally arrested him. Id.
Lujan alleged that his abduction violated the United Nations Charter, U.N. CHARTER
art. 2, and the Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 60. Gnger,
510 F.2d at 66. However, the Second Circuit noted that "[t]he 'provisions in question are
designed to protect the sovereignty of the states, and it is plainly the offended states
which must in the first instance determine whether a violation of sovereignty occurred,
or requires redress." Id.(citation omitted). The court concluded that "the failure of Bolivia or Argentina to object to Lujan's abduction would seem to preclude any violation of
international law which might otherwise occur." Id. at 67. But see Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irnvlar Extradition, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L 279, 293 ("'he remedies open
to a person who has been arrested in violation of international law would seem to be
very tenuous. However, he may be able to prevail upon the State whose territorial sovereignty has been violated to enter a diplomatic protest."); see also Mann, supra note 31, at
410 (stating that silence on the part of the state where the abduction occurred should
not be deemed a waiver of the wrong).
65 See cases discussed in Note, ExtrateritrialJurisdiction and JurisdictionFollndng Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent in InternationalLaw, 72 MICH. L REv. 1087, 1106-09
(1974) [hereinafter Extra;tnitorialJurisdiction].
66 Ex parte Susannah Scott, 109 Eng. Rep. 166 (ILB. 1829).
67 Id.at 167; see O'Higgins, supra note 64, at 280-91.
68 X v. Ministte public de la Confdiration de D 5arement ftdral de justice ,etpolice,
exceipted in 39 ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 228 (1983) [hereinafter X v.
Ministire].
69 Id.
70 Id
71 Convention Concerning Extradition and Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Jan. 17, 1958, Belg.-F.R.G., 328 U.N.T.S. 210.
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als. 72 The German-Swiss extradition treaty did not contain a similar clause. The Swiss Federal Tribunal refused to extradite the
man, on the grounds that Germany violated Belgium's rights under the German-Belgian extradition treaty by seeking extradition
from Switzerland after deceiving the man into going there.73 If it
allowed Switzerland to extradite the man, the tribunal stated that
it would be an accessory to the international wrong committed by
Germany against Belgium through its evasion of Belgium's rights
under the treaty.74
V.

ABDUCTION AS A VIOLATION OF THE
RIGHTS OF THE SUSPECT

Like courts in the United States, foreign courts faced with an
abductee's challenge to their jurisdiction have analyzed abduction
from the standpoint of the rights of the state where the abduction
occurred, not of the rights of the abductee.75 Curiously,
abductees objecting to jurisdiction have rarely raised the issue of
personal' rights that might bar jurisdiction. One of the few who
did so was Eichmann, who challenged the jurisdiction of the district court in Jerusalem on the grounds that his abduction in
Argentina violated the human rights law prohibition against arbitrary detention. Eichmann cited the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 76 as evidence that customary international law of human rights, a body of
law based on state practice that binds states even in the absence
of a treaty obligation, prohibits arbitrary detention.7 7 The Su-

72 Id. art. 4.
73 X v. Ministir, supra note 68, at 228-29.
74 Id at 230; sw also Extraterritoial Jurisdiction, supra note 65, at 1107-08 (French
court declining jurisdiction where French police made arrest in Belgium).
75 See infra note 78 and supra note 74.
76 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for sigaature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]
(entered into force Sept. 8, 1953).
77 Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36 I.LR. 277, 308 (Sup. Ct. Isr. 1962) (citing European Convention, supra note 76, art. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. at 226-28). On customary law of
human rights, see DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON

HUMAN RiGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1979, at I (It. Comm. Print 1980) ("There now exists an
international consensus that recognizes basic human rights and obligations owed by all
governments to their citizens. This consensus is reflected in a growing body of international law;, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights; and other international and regional human rights agreements. There is no doubt
that these rights are often violated; but virtually all governments acknowledge their validi-
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.preme Court of Israel, however, did not address the rights issue
and simply decided that any possible illegality in his abduction was
irrelevant once Eichmann was in Israel. 7
Nonetheless, the personal rights of a suspect are implicated in
an abduction." This was the opinion of the legal arm of the Organization of American States ("OAS") regarding Dr. AlvarezMachain. The OAS Permanent Council asked the Inter-American
Juridical Committee of the OAS to render an opinion on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain because
of the decision's "international repercussions, particularly in the
member states of the Organization of American States."' Evidently the Council was concerned that people in Latin American states
would be targets of the United States' abduction policy. The Committee found that the abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain had violated Mexico's territorial sovereignty and that the United States Supreme Court decision, that Dr. Alvarez-Machain could be tried
following the abduction, was an additional violation of Mexico's
territorial sovereignty."1 In addition to considering the rights of
Mexico and the United States, the Committee said that the abduction had violated personal rights of Dr. Alvarez-Machain. "The
Committee should likewise underscore the incompatibility of the
practice of abduction with the right of due process to which every
person is entitled, no matter how serious the crime they are ac82
cused of, a right protected by international law."

ty.').
78 Eichmann, 36 I.LR. at 304-08. In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188
(1992), the human rights issue was not pressed by Dr. Alvarez-Machain or by the many
amid curiae who wrote briefs in his behalf. Counsel apparently anticipated prevailing by
gaining an affirmance of the Ninth Circuit, which had ruled in Dr. Alvarez-Machain's
favor on the .treaty issue. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1466-67 (9th
Cir. 1991), irv'd, 112 S. CL 2188 (1992).
79 O'Higgins, su/ira note 64, at 319; see also Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 29; Martin
Feinrider,
utenitorial Abductions: A Newly Developing InternationalStandard, 14 AKRON L.
REV. 27, 45 (1980); John Quigley, Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger to Human
Rights from Kidnapping of Suspected Tenorists, 10 HUM. RTs. Q. 193, 198-208 (1988).
80 Request to the Inter-American Jurididal Committee, O.S. Res. CP/Res. 586
(909/92)/corr. 1, O.A.S. Permanent Council, OAS. Doc. No. OEA/ser. G/CP/Res. 586
(909/92)/corr.1 (July 15, 1992), reprinted in 13 HUM. RTs. Lj. 396 (1992).
81

Legal Opinion on the Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of America,

O.A.S. Res. CJI/Res.II-15/92, Inter-American Juridicial Committee, O.A.S. Doc. No.
OEA/ser. G/CP/doc. 2302/92 (Sept. 1, 1992), eprinted in 13 HUM. RTs. L.J. 395, 396
(1992).
82

Id. at 5, reprinted in 13 HUM. RTs. LJ. at 397.
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The Committee's reference to the personal rights of Dr.
Alvarez-Machain opened a line of analysis different from that pursued by the United States Supreme Court. Because the Court
decided that the federal district court had jurisdiction, the personal rights of Dr. Alvarez-Machain were clearly at issue. Had the
Court decided, like the Committee, that the abduction violated
rights personal to Dr. Alvarez-Machain, it c6uld not have found jurisdiction in the federal district court.
Abduction of suspects abroad is not mentioned in human
rights treaties. However, a number of guarantees found in human
rights law prohibit practices that are inevitably involved in an
abduction.
VI.

PERSONAL LIBERTY

Abduction violates the prohibition in human rights law against
arbitrary detention.' A detention can hardly be considered
nonarbitrary when it is carried out by hired kidnappers, or by
police acting outside their authority. Arbitrary detention also is
prohibited by customary international law.' In the Iran hostages
case, the International Court of Justice found that arbitrary detention of embassy personnel violates "applicable rules of general
international law," meaning customary law.' The court said,
Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to
subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is
in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, as well as with the fundamental
principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.8

83 See, eg., Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 59 (forcible abduction said to violate human
right to liberty and freedom from arbitrary detention); Wonne G. Grassie, Note, Federally
Sponsored InternationalKidnapping. An Acceptable Alternative to Extradition?, 64 WASH. U. LQ.
1205, 1214-15 (1986).
84 Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980), af/d, 654 F.2d
1382 (10th Cir. 1981); RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 702(e).
85 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J.
3, 41 [hereinafter U.S. v. Iran]. It is not clear whether the court limits itself to detention
of diplomatic and consular personnel or is applying this statement to any arbitrary detention. See NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 270
(1987) (suggesting that the court is referring to any arbitrary, prolonged detention).
86 U.S. v. Iran, supra note 85, at 42; see International Bill of Human Right: Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 9, GA. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, (1948) [hereinafter
Universal Declaration].
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Arbitrary detention is forbidden by the three regional human
rights treaties: the American Convention on Human Rights, 7 the
African Charter- of Human and Peoples' Rights,' and the European Convention. 8
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which the United States ratified in 1992, 9 states, "Everyone has
the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of
his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law."9' In the Celiberti case, the
Human Rights Committee that monitors compliance with the
International Covenant entertained a complaint from a woman
abducted from Brazil to Uruguay. 2 The Committee ruled that
abduction constituted an "arbitrary arrest and detention" under
the International Covenant. 93 In another case, L6pez Burgos, the
Committee reached the same conclusionf 4 A person abducted is
not held "in accordance with such procedures as are established
by law. 5 On -the contrary, when it occurs, an abduction is a
criminal act.
Furthermore, under the International Covenant, anyone detained unlawfully "shall have an enforceable right to compensation.9 Thus, an abductee, like Dr. Alvarez-Machain, is entitled to

87 American Convention. on Human Rights, art. 7(3), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No.
36, O.AS. Official Records OEA/Ser. A/16, [hereinafter American Convention] (entered
into force July 18, 1978), nprinted in 9 I.LM. 673, 675.
88 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, opened for signatureJune 27, 1981,
art. 6, O.A.U. I/I/Dec. 86/AC, [hereinafter African Charter] (entered into force Oct.
21, 1986), prninted in 21 I.LM. 58, 60.
89 See European Convention, supra note 76, art. 5. In his case, Eichmann unsuccessfully cited to the European Convention for support. See supra note 77.
90 See White House Statement, supra note 4; see also Paust, supra note 4; Quigley,
sup note 4.
91 International Covenant, supra note 4, art. 9(1), S. ExEc. Doc. E at 26, 999
U.N.T.S. at 176.
92 Ckibea,, supra note 21, at 185.
93 Id. at 188.
94 Lhpez Burgos, supra note 21, at 183.
95 Id. The Human Rights Committee concluded that L6pez Burgos' abduction violated article 9(1) of the International Covenant, supra note 4, S. EXEC. Doc. E at 26,
999 U.N.T.S. at 176, because "the act of abduction [of L6pez Burgos] into Uruguayan
territory constituted an arbitrary arrest and detention." L6pez Burgos, supra note 21, at
183.
96 International Covenant, supra note 4, art. 9(5), S. EXEc. Doc. E at 26, 999
U.N.T.S. at 176.
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monetary compensation from the United States for his detention. 7
One can seek to justify abduction of suspects abroad as an
appropriate method to ensure that someone who has committed a
serious crime will be brought to justice. Despite such considerations, the circumstances of detention are perforce arbitrary, because whether the abductors are private parties or police, the person is not held pursuant to law while in the state where the abduction occurs.
VII.

PERSONAL INTEGRrIY

Abduction is an act of violence. An arrest, of course, is an act
of violence, but is carried out under authority of law, while an abduction is not. Moreover, abductions have often been carried out
with considerable force. Some victims have been held at gunpoint
throughout their journey to the state that seeks to prosecute
them,9" and others have been transported in closed containers'
or forcibly drugged."° The abductee may not understand that
the abductors plan to deliver him to trial, but may fear that they
will kill him. An abductee presumably is justified in killing the
abductors if an opportunity presents itself because of the illegality
of the abduction.
The Ceiberti case vividly illustrates the assault on personal
integrity involved in an abduction. In that case, Uruguayan police
abducted Lilian Celiberti, a Uruguayan national, from Brazil. 10'
The Uruguayan police entered Celiberti's apartment in Brazil and
forcibly took her children to another location.0 2 The police
then held Celiberti captive for one week in her apartment while
03
they made arrangements to transport her to Uruguay.

97 Since the right is personal to the individual, it applies even if the state where the
abduction occurred makes no representations over the incidenL
98 United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981) (abductee held with gun to
head during plane ride from Bimini to Florida).
99 Italy Balks Air Abduction of Man in a Trunk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1964, at AI; Italy
Expels 2 Egyptian Envoys Accused in Trunk Abduction Attempt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1964, at
Al; Man in Trunk Returns to Israe4 N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1964, at A6. Egyptian officials
kidnapped Mordecai Luk, apparently on charge of spying, in Italy. Ld. The officials
drugged Luk and then locked him in a trunk for transport to Egypt. Id. An airport employee discovered Luk at Rome airport when he heard Luk moan from inside the trunk.
Id.
100 Toscanino was drugged for the air journey from Uruguay to the United States.
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1974).
101 C libert, supra note 21, at 187.
102 Id. at 186.
103 Id.
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Abductors are typically not in a position to treat the abductee
well, even if they are disposed to do so. Since the abduction is
carried out against the consent of the state where it occurs, the
abductors must avoid detection which will be a greater priority for
them than the welfare of the abductee. As a result, there is little
assurance that they will treat the abductee humanely.
A guarantee against "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment"
has entered into customary law. °' 4 The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights protects "security of the person" 1°5 and prohibits
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."" °6 The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights forbids "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, " ' °7 and further provides
that "[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person.""° Similar provisions are found in the regional human'
rights treaties.0 9
In recognition that an abductee's rights are at stake, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States ex rel. Lujan v.
Genger,n" decided that the abductee's right to due process is violated when treatment is sufficiently cruel."' When the treatment
reaches this point, the court stated that it would not have jurisdiction over him." 2 In United States v. Toscanino,"3 the abductee
alleged that Brazilian police, with the knowledge of a United

104 RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 702(d).
105 Universal Dedaration,supra note 86, art. 3.
106 Id. art. 5.
107 International Covenant, supra note 4, art. 7, S. ExEc. Doc. E at 25, 999 U.N.T.S.
at 175.
108 Id. art. 10(1), S. EXEc. Doc. E at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
109 Se e.g., American Convention, supra note 87, art. 5(1), (2) ("Every person has
the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected" and is protected
against "cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment."), eprinted in 9 I.L.M. at
676; European Convention, supra note 76, art. 3 ("No one shall be subjected to torture
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); African Charter, supra note 88,
art. 4 ("Human beings are inviolable," and "[e]very human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person."), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 60; African
Charter, supra note 88, art. 5 (guaranteeing "respect of the dignity inherent in a human
being" and prohibiting "inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment"), eprinted in
21 I.LM. at 60.
110 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
111 Id. at 65-66. However, in this case, the Second Circuit determined that the circumstances surrounding Lujan's abduction from Argentina did not meet this standard. Id.
at 66.
112 rd.
113 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
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States attorney, had knocked him unconscious, drugged him, and
interrogated him under torture. 114 The court thus set a limit on
how badly an abductee may be treated without a forfeiture of jurisdiction.
VIII.

DETENTION UNDER LEGAL AUTHORITY

The abductee's status is insecure because no legal regime
covers the detention, at least until the abductee is delivered to the
state that sponsored the abduction. Customary law protects both a
right to be brought promptly before
a judge and a right to chal5
lenge the lawfulness of detention."
Consistent with the rule of law idea, a detainee is entitled to
be held within a legal framework. Under international standards,
"all measures affecting the human rights of a person under any
form of detention ... shall be ordered by or be under the effec116
tive control of a judicial or other authority under the law."
The words "other authority" indicate a quasi-judicial officer "whose
status and tenure should afford the strongest possible guarantees
of competence, impartiality and independence." 117 A police officer is not a "judicial or other authority," and a private abductor is
even less so."' With abduction, detention is not under the control of a "judicial or other authority."
At trial, the district court released Dr. Alvarez-Machain because the government lacked sufficient evidence that he committed the crime for which the DEA abducted him." 9 Thus, the
DEA did not have sufficient evidence to prosecute. An abductee,
however, has no judicial recourse in the state of the seizure to
complain that he is innocent. The possibility of mistake in abduction is illustrated by the previously mentioned Israeli acts of forc-

114 Id. at 269-70.
115 RODLEY, supra note 85, at 269.
116 Draft Body of Prindplesfor the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Hum. Rts. Comm., art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Agenda Item 89, U.N. Doc.
A/34/146 (1979) [hereinafter Draft Body of P~indples]. For a convenient source for the
text of the Draft Body of Prindples and other United Nations documents cited below on
treatment of detainees, see RODLEY, supra note 85, at 343.
117 Draft Body of Pindples, supra note 116, art. 3.
118 See RODLEY, supra note 85, at 265 (concluding that practice in some states of
security officers holding power of arrest and detention would violate right to be under
judicial authority).
119 Newton, supranote 17, at Al.

1993]

ABDUCTION OF SUSPECTS ABROAD

741

ing down aircraft in search of suspected terrorists.120 2In two of
these instances, the persons sought were not on board.' '
An abductee has no possibility of vindicating any rights because he lacks judicial recourse. An abductee is not presented before a judge where he might complain either about the conditions22
of the detention or about the legality of the detention itself.
In recognition of the importance of allowing such pleas, international standards give detainees a right to be taken before a judge
soon after arrest. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a "right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by
the constitution or by law." 23 The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights provides:
Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by
law to exercise judicial power ....

Anyone who is deprived of

his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide
detention and order his
without delay on the lawfulness of his
124
release if the detention is not lawful.
The American and European conventions contain similar guarantees. 12
A detainee has a right not to be held incommunicado and,
specifically, a right to immediately inform his family of.the detention.126 An abductee has no way of enforcing this right and is

120 See supra notes 23-24, 38.
121 Gooding, supra note 23, at 163, 175-76; Friedman, supra note 23, at A!; Smith,
supra note 36, at Al.
122 RODLEY, supra note 85, at 261-63.
123 Universal Dedaration,supra note 86, art. 8.
124 International Covenant, supra note 4, art. 9(3), (4), S. Extc. Doc. E at 26, 999
U.N.T.S. at 175; see also RODLEY, supra note 85, at 267.
125 Se, eg., American Convention, supra note 87, art. 7(5), (6) ("Any person detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to
Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to
exercise judicial power ....
recourse to a competent court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the
lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest or detention is
unlawful . . . ."), reprinted in 9 ILM. at 677; European Convention, supra note 76, art.
5(4) ("Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a
court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.").
126 U.S. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRES, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisonem, art. 92, in FIRST U.N. CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE
TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, adopted Aug. 30, 1955, at 93, U.N. Doc. A/Conf./6/1. U.N.
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held in a kind of legal limbo, deprived of any recourse to competent authority. If the abductors have difficulty arranging clandestine transport to the other state, they may hold the person for a
substantial period of time. 127 An abductee has no opportunity to
appeal to authority to complain about the fact of or conditions of
detention. Such a right, however, is supposed to be provided by
any state that detains a person. "A detained ... person shall immediately be provided, by the authority responsible for his...
detention... with... an explanation of his rights... relating
to

his ...
28

detention ...

and

how

to

avail

himself of his

rights.'
Another aspect of being under no legal regime is that a detainee has no means to enforce his right to medical treatment 29
which is a particular problem because of the force typically used
to effectuate the detention. In addition, abductors likely will be reluctant to seek medical attention for the abductee, for fear of
having the detention become known.
Beyond the personal welfare of the abductee, rights of others
are potentially involved. The abductors may take the abductee
away from an ill relative or a dependent child." Normally, police making an arrest would deal with such situations. Abductors
are not likely to do so.

Sales No. 1956.IV.4 (1956), approved by E.S.C. Res. 663 (XXIV), U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess.,
994th mtg., Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076
(LXII), U.N. ESCOR, 62d Scss., 2059th mtg., Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988
(1977) [hereinafter Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners]; see also Draft
Body of Principles, supra note 116, art. 17 (right to reasonable opportunity to communicate
with outside world).
127 See, e.g., Ceiberti, supra note 21, at 186 (held in captivity of one week prior to
transportation out of Brazil).
128 Draft Body of Principles, supra note 116, art. 12.
129 The United Nations has recognized that prisoners are entitled to prompt medical
treatment. See, eg., Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, art. 6, GA. Res. 34/169,
U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980) (stating that police
have a duty to take immediate action to secure medical attention for persons in their
custody whenever required); Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra
note 126, art. 91 (right of untried prisoner to be treated by own doctor or dentist at
own expense); Draft Body of Pinciples, supra note 116, art. 21 (medical officer at place of
detention shall examine detainee promptly after admission); id. art. 22 (righi to physician
of choice); Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Declaration on the Police-PartA,
Res. 690 (1979), art. 14 (obligation of police to secure necessary medical attention for
detainee); see also RODLEY, supra note 85, at 260.
130 See, e.g., Ceiibert, supra note 21, at 186.
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IX.

STATUS OF THE SUSPECT IN THE STATE
WHERE ABDUCTION OCCURS

Even apart from rights connected with criminal proceedings,
abduction deprives an individual of the right to choose whether to
leave or remain in the state where the abduction occurs. A person
lawfully in a state has a right to remain there,1 3' and a national
has- a right of permanent residence.' 2 Therefore, Dr. AlvarezMachain, as a national of Mexico, had a right to remain in Mexico.'-' Even an alien has a right to reside in a state, at least until
expelled by a decision taken under the law of that state. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states, "An
alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision
reached in accordance with law""s and has a right to representation by counsel to contest the grounds for expulsion.3 5 In abductions, the person is removed from the state by decision of
executive officials of a different state.
In addition, individuals, under human rights law, enjoy the
right to leave their state of residence. This right is guaranteed by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 3 7 and the American Convention on Human Rights."s If, as may be the case, the
abductee formerly resided in the state carrying out the abduction,

131 International Covenant, spra note 4, arts. 12(1), 13, S. ExEc. Doc. E at 27, 999
U.N.T.S. at 176.
132 Id.art. 12(4), S. ExEc. Doc. E at 27, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176 ("No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.").
133 Id
134 Id.art. 13, S. ExEc. Doc. E at 27, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176; see also American Convention, supra note 87, art. 22 (*An alien lawfully in the 'territory of a State Party to this
Convention may be expelled from it only pursuant to a decision reached in accordance
with law."), rejrinted in 9 LLM. at 682; African Charter, subra note 88, art. 12 ("A nonnational legally admitted in a territory of a State Party to the present Charter, may only
be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law."), nrinted
in 21 I.LM. at 61.
135 International Covenant, supra note 4, art. 13, S. ExEc. Doc. E at 27, 999 U.N.T.S.
at 176.
136 Universal Dedaration, supra note 85, art. 13(2) ("Everyone has the right to leave
any country, including his own, and to return to his country.").
137 International Covenant, supra note 4, art. 12(4), S. Ex~c. Doc. E at 27, 999
U.N.T.S. at 176 ("Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.").
138 American Convention, supra note 87, art. 22(2) ("Every person has the right to
leave any country freely, including his own."), nprinted in 9 I.L.M. at 681.
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the right to leave that state is violated when the individual is abducted back there.
The abductee may have fled the state sponsoring the abduction because of persecution. All persons have a right to seek asylum in other states." 9 If the abductee fled the state sponsoring
the abduction, the right of asylum is violated.
X.

ABDUCTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND PoLITICAL RIGfHS

Most, if not all, the guarantees discussed here are provided by
customary international law, even apart from any treaty binding on
a particular state." However, the issue of violation of personal
rights of the abductee assumed new meaning for the United States
in 1992, when it ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.' The United States, in connection with ratification, entered a "declaration" that articles 1 to 27 are not self-executing142 These articles are the provisions of the Covenant that
impose obligations on states. "The intent," explained the Foreign
Relations Committee, "is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts ....
[E]xisting U.S.
law generally complies with the Covenant; hence, implementing
legislation is not contemplated." 43
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights falls
into the category of treaties that courts have called "self-executing." The parties intend that the various rights guaranteed should
inure to the benefit of individual persons.'" Even if the International Covenant does not "create a private cause of action," an
abductee would still be entitled to rely on it to object to jurisdic-

139 Universal Dtdamgito, supra note 86, art. 14(1) ("Everyone has the right to seek
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."); American Convention, supra
note 87, art. 22(7) ("Every person has the right to seek and be granted asylum in a
foreign territory, in accordance with the legislation of the state and international conventions, in the event he is being pursued for political offenses or related common
crimes."), vetinted in 9 I.L.M. at 682.
140 Even if a court were to find that any one of the above-mentioned rights had not
entered customary law, the violations taken together violate customary law. Tribunals have
frequently cumulated violations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNrrED STATES, § 179 n.1 (1965).
141 See sources cited supra note 4.
142 138 CONG. REC. S4784 (Apr. 2, 1992).
143 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIvrL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTs, S. ExEc. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1992) (report accompanies EXEC. E 95-2) (proposing ratification), reprinted in 31 1.L.M. 648 (1992).
144 International Covenant, supra note 4, S. ExEC. Doc. E at 23, 999 U.N.T.S. at 171.
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tion. In so doing, the abducte would not be asserting a private
cause of action.
Most courts, like the United States Supreme Court, have ignored the rights of the abductee 14 5 They have not been able to
forego the opportunity to try a person who is standing before
them. Nonetheless, courts have long recognized that there are
situations in which persons who may be guilty of crime must be
released to vindicate important societal policies. Where an accused
was entrapped,1" or where critical evidence was seized unlawful" 7 potentially guilty persons go free.
ly,14
The same should be true with abduction, and the Human
Rights Committee' and the Inter-American Juridical Committee
have recognized this."' The values served by the observance of
the norms on lawful detention outweigh the importance of trying
a particular suspect. Individuals should not have to live in fear
that some foreign government, operating on real or fanciful suspi-.
cion, will send operatives or hire kidnappers to abduct him. Human rights law provides that such abduction is unlawful. Abduction, writes one analyst of extradition law, is "such a manifestly
extra-legal act, and in practice so hazardous and uncertain, that it
is unworthy" of serious consideration as an alternative method to
extradition. "

In neglecting personal rights, the Supreme Court in AlvarezMachain ignored what should have been a critical issue in the
case. Abduction violates freedoms protected under the conventional and customary law of human rights. Now, particularly with
the United States ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights in 1992, the Supreme Court should pay
closer attention to the personal rights that are protected at the
international level. A person abducted for prosecution is entitled

145 See supra notes 74, 78.
146 Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
147 See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)

(excluding evi-

dence seized in violation of Constitution); Case of Gioeq, 11 Biull. Verkh. Suda RSFSR 5

(1981) (incriminating ammunition excluded from evidence because when it was discovered during search in a dresser drawer, no member of the household was present in that

room to observe the search).
148 See, ag, Clibesti, supra note 21, at 187-88 (Committee ruling that Celiberti should
be released immediately, be permitted to leave country, ,and receive compensation from

Uruguay for the violations that Celiberti suffered); Lspa Burgos, supra note 21, at 183
(Committee ruling that L6pez Burgos should receive similar remedies as Celiberti).

149
150

See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
SHEARER, supra note 31, at 75.
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to be released and compensated for damages caused by that abduction.
Because it ignored the human rights issue in Alvarez-Machain,
the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the matter. The AlvarezMachain opinion cannot be taken as a rejection of arguments
based on human rights. It is thus open to the lower courts, state
or federal, to decline jurisdiction following an abduction without
evading precedent. Given the obvious violation of human rights
involved, it is incumbent on courts to reach that conclusion.
Like the United States Supreme Court, the highest courts of
other states have not confronted squarely the question of whether
a trial following abduction violates the personal rights of the accused. It is remarkable that the courts have avoided addressing an
issue that so clearly implicates individual rights. Particularly in
light of the increasing adherence by states to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, courts should cease to
address this issue solely from a statist perspective. Courts should
decline jurisdiction as the only way of ensuring state compliance
with international human rights standards.

